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OBSCENITY IN THE AGE OF DIRECT BROADCAST
SATELLITE: A FINAL BURIAL FOR STANLEY v.
GEORGIA(?), A NATIONAL OBSCENITY STANDARD,
AND OTHER MISCELLANY
[C]ommunications technology is dynamic, capable tomorrow of
making today obsolete.'
The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolu-
tionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until
a third, fourth, or fifth "logical" extension occurs. Each step,
when taken, appeared a reasonable step in relation to that
which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one
that would never have been seriously considered in the first
instance. 2
In February, 1990, a Montgomery County, Alabama, grand jury
returned an indictment against four companies on charges of
obscenity.3 In November, 1990, the U.S. Attorney's offices in New
York and Utah accepted plea agreements stipulating a guilty
plea by one of the four companies for a felony charge of distrib-
uting obscene material. 4 These charges, targeting obscenity, are
among the first filed on the state and federal levels against
companies utilizing direct satellite transmission.
The scrambled 5 and unscrambled direct broadcast satellite sig-
nal is distinct from any other form of media. This distinctive
nature of the direct broadcast satellite signal requires a fresh
look at obscenity regulation. The direct broadcast signal is dis-
1. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978), affid on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
2. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 127 (1973).
3. Satellite Film Channel Faces Obscenity Counts, CHI. TRm., Feb. 18, 1990, at 24.
4. Plea Agreement, United States v. Home Dish Only Satellite Network, Inc., No. 90-
00196-S (W.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 28, 1990);. Plea Agreement, United States v. Home Dish
Only Satellite Network, Inc., No. 90-216-W (D. Utah filed Nov. 28, 1990) (the New York
and the Utah Plea Agreements are exact duplicates of one another and were filed on the
same day) [hereinafter Plea Agreement]. The subject of both actions was "an obscene
movie short entitled HARDCORE GIRLFRIENDS." Felony Information, United States v. Home
Dish Only Satellite Network, Inc., No. 90-000196-S, at 1 (W.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 28, 1990);
Felony Information, United States v. Home Dish Only Satellite Network, Inc., No. 90-
216-W, at 1 (D. Utah filed Nov. 28, 1990) (the New York and the Utah Felony Informations
are exact duplicates of one another and were filed on the same day) [hereinafter Felony
Information].
5. A scrambled signal is electronically converted into a format unintelligible by con-
ventional television receivers.
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similar to the radio, broadcast, or cable television signal in that
its distributional area encompasses numerous "communities." The
''communities" concept is a primary consideration for a fact finder
to apply when determining whether a particular work is obscene.
Unlike movies shown in theaters, the movies broadcast unscram-
bled over direct broadcast satellites cannot be targetted to only
carefully selected and narrowly defined areas. The cases this
Note discusses highlight the new challenges facing prosecutors
and the courts dealing with the age-old problem of obscenity.
Home Dish Only Satellite (HDOS), based in New York, broad-
cast adult material on the "American Exxxtasy" Channel until
March 9, 1990.6 During the early evening hours of transmission,
HDOS broadcast, unscrambled, a "soft-porn" film and previews
of "hard-core" films to be broadcast later in the evening.7 Hard-
core films and adult product advertisements followed. HDOS
scrambled 8 the hard-core films to prevent unauthorized access.9
HDOS advertised and sold subscription rights to the scrambled
sections of the service during the unscrambled part of the broad-
cast. 0
U.S. Satellite Corporation, Inc. (USSC) transmitted both the
unscrambled and the scrambled material from an uplink facility1
in Utah to a GTE Spacenet 2 satellite travelling in a geosynchro-
6. See Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 2.
7. This Note uses the terms "soft-porn" and "hard-core" to describe the degree of
pornographic (sexually explicit) content of the motion picture and not to denote any
specific designation as obscene. The term "hard-core" as used in this Note refers to
material that contains scenes of actual sexual acts and is more sexually explicit than
"soft-porn." For a definition of "sexually explicit," see infra note 44.
8. A satellite dish owner was capable of receiving the scrambled signal. See infra notes
16-17 and accompanying text.
9. "Unauthorized access" means access by individuals who had not purchased the
services of HDOS. As such, the free, unscrambled broadcasts were apparently designed
as a sales promotion device for the later scrambled pay service broadcast. See, Prospectus,
Home Dish Only Satellite Network, September 28, 1987, 2, reprinted in State's memoran-
dum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit C, Alabama v. U.S. Satellite,
No. CC-90-972-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed July 11, 1990) [hereinafter
Prospectus].
10. Id.
11. An uplink facility is a ground-based broadcast facility that transmits a signal to a
satellite for retransmission to ground receiver stations. Id. at 1.
12. GTE Spacenet is a subsidiary company of the General Telephone and Electronics
Corporation (GTE). GTE was the fourth company indicted in this series of cases, presum-
ably due to its connection as corporate parent of GTE Spacenet. GTE Named in Satellite
TV Obscenity Case, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at D2.
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nous orbit.13 The satellite's orbit permitted the retransmitted
signal to be received throughout the continental United States,
part of Mexico, and a portion of Canada. 14
In coordination with transmission of the scrambled films, USSC
transmitted the signature codes of American Exxxtasy subscrib-
ers' descramblers.' 5 These signature codes actuated descramblers 6
linked to the subscribers' television sets. A small number of
Montgomery County, Alabama, residents subscribed to the Amer-
ican Exxxtasy Channel and obtained descrambling devices to
receive the broadcasts.17
Following the broadcast, children gained access to a number
of descrambled movies and soon circulated video cassette tape
copies of the movies in neighborhood schools.' After local officials
received complaints, Alabama convened a grand jury to review
the films to determine whether the films were obscene 19 according
13. See MARIKA N. TAISHOFF, STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE DIRECT BROADCAST SAT-
ELLITE 3-4 (1987) (discussing the importance of geostationary orbits to direct broadcast
satellites).
14. The satellite's "broadcast footprint," or simply the "footprint," defines the reception
area for any particular satellite. See generally Herbert Dordick, The Communication
Satellite: Newton and Clarke Cooperate, in INTERNATIONAL SATELLITE AND CABLE TELEVI-
SION: RESOURCE MANUAL FOR THE FOURTH BIENNIAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW SYMIPOSIUM 5,
10-37 (UCLA Communications Law Program ed., 1985) [hereinafter RESOURCE MANUAL]
(discussing the current technology and uses of satellite transmissions). The satellite's
broadcast footprint is the geographic area in which homes are capable of receiving the
broadcast from a particular satellite. Prospectus, supra note 9, at 1.
15. Decoding devices are generally available to the public through retail outlets. Each
has a unique identification number and activation code allowing the decoder to operate
upon receipt of the code in conjunction with a scrambled transmission. Both of these are
simultaneously broadcast from the uplink. Prospectus, supra note 9, at 1.
16. The decoding device's identification signature must be programmed into the broad-
cast. When the signal is received in conjunction with the identification code, the signal
activates the decoder, allowing the device to unscramble the signal. If a decoder's
identification signature is not broadcast in conjunction with the signal, the device cannot
be activated and the signal is received in an unintelligible form. Id. at 1.
17. Montgomery County, Alabama, had 50 of HDOS' 1.2 million subscribers. Sam Howe
Verhovek, Cuomo Turns Down Request to Extradite Cable Officials, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1990, at B4.
18. GTE Named in Satellite TV Obscenity Case, supra note 12. How the children gained
access to video tapes of the films remains a mystery. The pleadings in the case do not
address the question of whether the television set that received the broadcasts was
equipped with a child lock-out device.
19. The Supreme Court set forth factors in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), for
determining whether material is considered "obscene":
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of [the] regulation [of obscene ma-
terials] to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must
be specifically defined by applicable state law, as written or authoritatively
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to prevailing community standards ° in Montgomery County, Al-
abama. The state grand jury returned indictments21 on February
13, 1990, against HDOS, USSC, GTE, and GTE Spacenet Corpo-
ration in Montgomery County District Court for violating the
Alabama Code 22 involving the distribution 23 of obscene material. 24
The U.S. Attorney's offices in Utah and the Western District
of New York followed suit, and, in accordance with a plea agree-
construed....
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). The Court has since fine-tuned the doctrinal
test of Miller by holding that the jury must utilize a reasonable person standard to
determine the value of a particular work. This value does not vary between communities.
See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 & n.3 (1987).
20. The fact finder uses local community standards to judge whether a work is obscene.
See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
21. The fact that the movies came to the attention of authorities through children may
have affected the grand jury's determination. This Note, however, discounts this possi-
bility and evaluates the cases as if the grand jury's determination was based solely on
the nature and content of the films and on the prevailing community standards of
tolerance in Montgomery County, Alabama.
22. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with
intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute any obscene material for
any thing of pecuniary value. Any person who violates this subsection shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine
of not more than $10,000 and may also be imprisoned in the county jail or
sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than one year.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, being a wholesaler, to knowingly
distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or agree to distribute,
for the purpose of resale or commercial distribution at retail, any obscene
material for any thing of pecuniary value. Any person who violates this
subsection shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $20,000 and may also be imprisoned in
the county jail or sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than
one year.
ALA. CODE S 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 1990).
23. Section 13A-12-200.1(3) defines "distribute" as "[tio import, export, sell, rent, lend,
transfer possession of or title to, display, exhibit, show, present, provide, broadcast,
transmit, retransmit, communicate by telephone, play, orally communicate or perform."
Id. S 13A-12-200.1(3).
24. The corporations were charged with 36 violations for the distribution of the
following features: RAMB-OHH! SEX PLATOON, ORIENTAL JADE, DEEP INSIDE TRADING,
HARDCORE GIRLFRIENDS, FURBURGERS, HOT SHORTS, GINGER DOES 'EM ALL, TROPIC OF
DESIRE, SANTA COMES TWICE, THE END OF INNOCENCE, AMAZING TAILS, BLOW OFF, YOUNG
GIRLS Do, FANTASY CHAMBER, and AMAZING TAILS HAPPY HOUR. See, e.g., Indictment at
2-8, State v. GTE Spacenet, Corp., No. 90-000475-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala.
filed Feb. 13, 1990); Indictment at 2-8, State v. GTE, Corp., No. 90-000473-G (Cir. Ct.
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ment, filed a felony information on November 28, 1990, against
HDOS 25 for violating the federal statute 6 prohibiting the distri-
bution of obscene materials by cable or subscription television. 7
Pursuant to Alabama law,28 the Governor of Alabama requested
extradition of four principals of HDOS from the State of New
York.29 The Governor of New York refused extradition., The
New York Attorney General's office found no indication that the
transmissions in question in fact were obscene in New York, and
the Alabama law did not require the transmissions to be legally
obscene in New York.3'
USSC filed a motion to dismiss the Alabama indictments. 2
USSC argued that Alabama failed to demonstrate jurisdiction
and venue for the case because any action that did take place
did not take place within Alabama.P3 USSC further claimed that
its status as a common carrier protected USSC from the content
violations of others because the federal regulation in the broad-
cast area preempted state law and shielded USSC from state
prosecution."' USSC raised due process concerns based on federal
Montgomery County, Ala. filed Feb. 13, 1990); Indictment at 2-8, State v. U.S. Satellite,
Inc., No. 90-000971-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed Feb. 13, 1990) (all of the
above Indictments are exact duplicates of one another with the exception of defendant
name and case number) [hereinafter Indictment].
25. Felony Information, supra note 4. The U.S. Attorney's office has not pursued
charges against USSC, GTE, or GTE Spacenet.
26- (a) Whoever knowingly utters any obscene language or distributes any
obscene matter by means of cable television or subscription services on
television, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or
by a fine in accordance with this title, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term "distribute" means to send, transmit,
retransmit, telecast, broadcast, or cablecast, including by wire, microwave,
or satellite, or to produce or provide material for such distribution.
(c) Nothing in this chapter, or the Cable Communications Policy Act of
1984, or any other provision of Federal law, is intended to interfere with or
preempt the power of the States, including political subdivisions thereof, to
regulate the uttering of language that is obscene or otherwise unprotected
by the Constitution or the distribution of matter that is obscene or otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution, of any sort, by means of cable television
or subscription services on television.
18 U.S.C.A. S 1468 (West Supp. 1991).
27. Felony Information, supra note 4.
28. ALA. CODE S 13A-12-200.6 (Supp. 1990).
29. Verhovek, supra note 17.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, State v. U.S. Satellite, Inc., No. 90-
000971 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed June 8, 1990).
33. Id. at 1-2.
34. Id. at 1-3. But see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1468(c) (West Supp. 1991), which is reprinted supra
note 26.
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common carrier mandates 5 and also claimed it lacked the mens
rea to commit the crime 6 Finally, USSC questioned whether any
crime in fact had been committed, arguing that a fact finder
cannot consider a scrambled signal obscene 7 State Judge William
Gordon, hearing USSC's motion argument, granted the motion
to dismiss on October 29, 1990.38
35. United States Satellite is a common carrier transmitter that received its authori-
zation from the FCC to commence operation in 1980 conditioned on USSC's agreement
"not [to] be substantially involved in the production, writing or the selection of, or
otherwise influence, the content of any information to be transmitted over its facilities."
FCC Order and Certificate at 3, No. W-P-C-3580 (adopted Dec. 24, 1980), reprinted in
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, Exhibit 1, State v. U.S. Satellite, Inc., No. 90-
000971 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed June 8, 1990) [hereinafter FCC Order].
A "communications common carrier" as defined in 47 U.S.C. S 702(7) (1988) refers to
the Communications Act of 1934, which in turn defines "common carrier" as "any person
engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, . . . but a person engaged in
radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common
carrier." 47 U.S.C. 5 153(h) (1988).
47 U.S.C. S 202(a) (1988) states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unrea-
sonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, fa-
cilities, or services for or in connection with like communication service,
directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class of
persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or
locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
Id.; see also infra notes 53-98 and accompanying text.
36. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 4, U.S. Satellite (No. 90-000971) (arguing
that USSC performed all activities of an uplink operator "without knowledge that any
signal would ever be received in Montgomery County, Alabama"). ALA. CODE S 13A-12-
200.2 (Supp. 1990) prohibits "knowingly distribut[ing]."
One can interpret USSC's argument that it lacked the mens rea sufficient for prose-
cution in two ways. First, USSC possibly was arguing that although it was aware that
the signal being uplinked would be rebroadcast, it was not aware that the rebroadcast
footprint would include Montgomery County, Alabama. Alternately, USSC's argument
could have been that although it was aware that the signal being uplinked would be
rebroadcast and that the broadcast footprint would include Montgomery County, Alabama,
it was unaware that the signal could be decoded in Montgomery County, Alabama. The
latter interpretation of USSC's argument would be based on the allegation that USSC
had no control over decoding devices and had no knowledge that a decoding device
capable of being activated by the uplink signal was located in Montgomery County,
Alabama.
The former interpretation of USSC's argument, however, is bolstered by a later
reference to the fact the USSC "possessed no knowledge or control as to where the
signal it uplinked was to be distributed and therefore, cannot knowingly distribute obscene
materials." Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 4, U.S Satellite (No. 90-000971)
(emphasis added).
37. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 5, U.S. Satellite (No. 90-000971).
38. Judge Gordon granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice. Case Action Summary
at 2, State v. U.S. Satellite, Inc., No. 90-000971-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed
Feb. 13, 1990).
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State prosecutors filed motions for nolle prosequi39 in the GTE
cases 40 and the GTE Spacenet case.41 On October 29, 1990, HDOS
pled guilty to two counts of distribution of obscene material and
was fined $10,000 for each count.42
HDOS and two of its principal operators submitted to a plea
agreement concerning the felony informations in New York and
Utah.43 As part of the plea agreement, the principals named in
the agreement promised to abstain from "promot[ing], sell[ing] or
distribut[ing] materials that depict sexually explicit conduct 44 [and
from] knowingly owning [or] having [an] interest in. .. any entity
whose principal business promotes, sells, or distributes" the same.4 5
Furthermore, the principals agreed to pay a sizable fine.46 In
exchange for use immunity, the principals promised "to be de-
briefed . . . concerning their knowledge of and participation in
the operations of HDO[S]. . .[and] to testify as witnesses before
any federal grand jury investigating possible obscenity violations
...and at any trials. 47
This Note discusses federal and state obscenity laws as applied
to direct broadcast satellite, particularly in reference to the
39. The prosecuting attorney files a nolle prosequi motion with the court to declare
that the attorney will not prosecute the case. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed.
1990).
40. The prosecutor filed the nolle prosequi motion in CC 90-000477-G on May 2, 1990,
and the state judge granted the motion the same day. Case Action Summary at 2, State
v. GTE Corp., No. 90-000477-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed Feb. 13, 1990).
.The prosecutor filed the nolle prosequi motion in 90-000476-G on April 25, 1990, and the
state judge granted the motion the next day. Case Action Summary at 2, State v. GTE
Spacenet Corp., No. 90-000476-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed Feb. 13, 1990).
41. The prosecutor filed the motion for nolle prosequi on April 25, 1990, and the state
judge granted the motion the next day. Case Action Summary, Alabama v. GTE Spacenet
Corp., No. 90-000475-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed Feb. 13, 1990).
42. The state judge allowed $7500 of each fine to be suspended on the condition that
HDOS donate $75,000 to each of two specified charities. Sentencing Order, Alabama v.
Home Dish Only Satellite Networks, Inc., No. 90-002199-G (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County,
Ala. filed Feb. 13, 1990).
43. Plea Agreement, supra note 4.
44. Sexually explicit conduct is defined in 18 U.S.C.A. §2256(2) (West Supp. 1991) as:
factual or simulated-
(A) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital,
or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex;
(B) bestiality;
(C) masturbation;
(D) sadistic or masochistic; abuse; or
(E) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person . . ..
Id.
45. Plea Agreement, supra note 4, at 4-5.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id. at 7-8.
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HDOS cases. First, it discusses first the liability of the satellite
owner and the uplink operator for obscenity as well as the use
of the common carrier defense.48 The question of liability revolves
around the determination of whether a state can hold a company
criminally accountable for actions the federal government re-
quires. The analysis demonstrates that a state cannot hold a
company criminally accountable for fulfilling that company's fed-
eral common carrier mandate.
Next, this Note addresses the potential criminal liability of the
originator and the uplink operator for obscenity in two contexts.
The first context addresses whether the legal community must
reevaluate the "community standard" criteria for the determi-
nation of obscenity outlined in Miller v. California4 9 to account
for the technological peculiarities of direct broadcast satellite.
Particularly relevant is a discussion of a national "lowest common
denominator" obscenity standard5° for satellite broadcasts beamed
for use in direct broadcast satellite home stations. The analysis
under this context demonstrates that the local community stan-
dard remains relevant for the originator of the scrambled signal
broadcast. The local community standard fails, however, when
utilized against the originator of the unscrambled direct broadcast
satellite signals.
Following this discussion, the Note explores the question of
whether the prosecutions of direct broadcast satellite owners and
uplink operators for obscenity would have a chilling effect by
placing these companies in the role of private censors to protect
themselves from criminal prosecution. Courts have previously
thrown out Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules for
cable operators that placed those operators in similar situations.-1
Analysis of the question in this analogous situation indicates that
48. See infra notes 53-100 and accompanying text.
49. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See infra notes 125-36 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Miller test.
50. This Note uses the term " 'lowest common denominator' obscenity standard" to
describe the aggregate lowest level of tolerance for any particular type of pornographic
display. The lowest common denominator obscenity standard thus could consist of a
tolerance for broadcasts of live topless but not fully nude dancing from Community A,
the tolerance of the broadcast of live nude dancing and certain but not all sexually
explicit language from Community B, and the tolerance for the broadcast of so-called
adult fare programs including images of live nude dancing from Community C. The
combination of all of these standards would apply to each of the communities to prevent
the broadcast of live nude dancing in Communities B and C despite the fact that the
communities would otherwise tolerate the programming.
51. See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 33:949
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courts will find that current rules may chill some broadcasts.
Recent cable decisions indicate that the chilling effect is enough
to exempt from liability any satellite owner or uplink operator
not acting knowingly or recklessly in facilitating the broadcast
of patently obscene materials.
Finally, this Note evaluates the question of whether a scram-
bled and otherwise unintelligible signal can be the subject of an
obscenity prosecution. Typically, the operator scrambles the sig-
nal and the receiver cannot unscramble that signal except through
a signal authorization that is broadcast simultaneously with the
material. The courts could protect the signal primarily because
the signal is unintelligible until it reaches the home, but also
because Stanley v. Georgia52 protects the broadcast once it is
received in the home and is descrambled. In this context, this
Note discusses the American Exxxtasy Channel cases as a final
bright-line delineation in the series of cases limiting the freedom
announced in Stanley.
COMMON CARRIER LIABILITY
The FCC granted GTE, GTE Spacenet, and USSC common
carrier 53 status for the particular satellite transponder4 involved
52. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley, the Court found that films discovered in a search
of the defendant's home could not form the basis for obscenity charges when the films
were not the subject of the search. The case has been interpreted to stand for the right
to possess obscene material in the home if the material is for personal, rather than
commercial, purposes. For a discussion of the decision in Stanley, see Michael Meyerson,
The Right to Speak, The Right to Hear, and the Right not to Hear: The Technological
Resolution to the Cable/Pornography Debate, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 137, 142-44 (1988).
53. A common-carrier service in the communications context is one that "'makes a
public offering to provide [communications facilities] whereby all members of the public
who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their
own design and choosing.'" FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979) (quoting
Report and Order, Indus. Relocation Serv., 5 F.C.C.2d 197, 202 (1966)) (determining
mandatory access rules promulgated by the FCC under the then-present statutory
authority were beyond the scope authorized by Congress). A common carrier does not
"make individualized decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal."
Id.
54. A transponder is an electronic device within the satellite that receives the uplink
signal on a particular wavelength and transforms the signal into rebroadcast form. The
satellite then strengthens and rebroadcasts the signal. Each satellite transponder can be
designated as to its common-carrier status independently of other transponders on the
satellite. The independence of each transponder is analogous to the independence of each
channel in a cable system in determination of common-carrier status. Id. at 701 n.9 (citing
National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs (NARUC) v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)); see also RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 14, at 21-25.
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in the American Exxxtasy Channel cases.55 FCC rules and deci-
sions required common carriers to provide services characterized
by two distinctive qualities: (1) the carrier must provide the
service to others without discrimination and on a first-come, first-
served basis and (2) the carrier must provide communication that
is the "transmission of intelligence of the user's own design and
choosing." 6 As a condition of this special status, common carriers
cannot, within certain bounds, control the content of the trans-
mission:
[C]ommon carriers have a general obligation to hold out their
services to the public on a first-come, first-served basis without
regard to content. Most authorities, however, recognize an
exception to this general rule which gives common carriers
the right to prohibit the use of their facilities for an illegal
purpose.57
The common carrier thus has a dual problem: although it has
a duty to refrain from any editorial review, the common carrier,
under penalty of sanctions, must not allow its customers to use
its facilities for an illegal purpose.- If the common carrier know-
ingly transmits communications pursuant to an illegal purpose,
then the federal government may hold the common carrier lia-
55. For example, see USSC's common-carrier license, reprinted in Order and Certificate,
U.S. Satellite Corp., No. W-P-C-3580 (adopted Dec. 24, 1980) and Exhibit A of Affidavit
of M. Glen Worthington, Alabama v. U.S. Satellite Corp., No. 90-000971 (Cir. Ct. Mont-
gomery County, Ala. filed June 28, 1990).
56. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 1978) (citing National
Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs (NARUC) v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 641 (D.C. Cir), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 992 (1976) and NARUC, 533 F.2d at 608-09), aff'd on other grounds, 440
U.S. 689 (1979).
57. Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory Ruling and Order, In the matter of Enforcement
of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of Obscene
Materials, 1987 FCC LEXIS 3907 (1987) (referring to Multipoint Distribution System
(MDS) common carriers). For a definition of MDS, see infra note 61; see also Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d at 1050-51 (describing one of the characteristics of common
carrier status as the transmission of another person's choice of programming).
58. See Dial Info. Serv. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding
the so-called Helms Amendment which, in part, prohibits the use of any "telephone
facility" for transmitting obscene or "indecent communication for commercial purposes
which is available to any person under 18 years of age," 47 U.S.C.A. S 223(b)(2)(A) (West
1991)), cert. denied, Dial Info. Serv. Corp. v. Barr, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 609 (Jan. 27, 1992).
The statute in question allowed the telephone company to present the affirmative defense
to any prosecution under S 223(b), that it acted "in good faith reliance upon the lack of
any representation by a provider of communications" that those communications were
covered by the prohibition. Id. S 223(c)(2(B)(i).
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ble.59 Also, if the operator was intimately involved in the pro-
duction of the material in question, had an interest in the
broadcast, or recklessly avoided knowledge of a patently and
openly illegal transmission, the federal government conceivably
could also hold the operator liable. 0 The paradox of this dual
problem may lead to the common carrier either remaining know-
ingly ignorant of all broadcasting under its control or, in the
alternative, scrutinizing all broadcast materials.
The FCC, however, does not require all common carriers to
screen all material that the carrier retransmits. The FCC, for
example, was hesitant to place multipoint distribution service6'
(MDS) common carriers "in the uncertain predicament of watching
all programming and assessing, in each instance, whether to
engage the legal machinery for interpretative rulings" to deter-
mine whether a particular message could be adjudicated an illegal
transmission. 62
The FCC has compared the common carrier satellite owner to
the telephone company carrying sexually oriented taped or live
material: "[T]here must be a high degree of involvement or actual
notice of an illegal use and failure to take steps to prevent such
transmissions before any liability is likely to attach."63 Liability
would depend on the role the company fulfills. When a telephone
company acts as a common carrier, liability often will not attach.64
59. "[I]n interpreting whether MDS common carriers are 'knowingly involved' in trans-
mitting obscene material, we will focus upon whether the carrier is passive. Unless an
MDS common carrier has actual notice that a program has been adjudicated obscene,
. . . it will not be subject to adverse agency action." Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory
Ruling and Order, 1987 FCC LEXIS at *10-11 (referring to MDS common carriers).
60. See id. ("[Wle will focus upon whether the carrier is passive" in determining whether
"common carriers are 'knowingly involved' in transmitting obscene material.").
61. A multipoint distribution system is a "[p]rivate microwave distribution service...
used to distribute TV programming as a commercial service." RESOURCE MANUAL, supra
note 14, at 430. An MDS is similar in many aspects to the direct broadcast satellite
distribution system.
62. Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 1987 FCC LEXIS at *8-9
(referring to Sable Communications, Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 1987 Dist. LEXIS
13421 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (requesting a declaratory order that Pacific Telephone would not
be liable for obscene messages sent over the Pacific Telephone system), affd in part,
rev'd in part, vacated in part, 890 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1989)).
63. Id. at *10.
64. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. S 223(c) (West 1991):
(1) A common carrier . . . shall not, to the extent technically feasible,
provide access to [an obscene or indecent] communication ... from the
telephone of any subscriber who has not previously requested in writing the
carrier to provide access to such communication. . ..
(2) [N]o cause of action may be brought in any court or administrative
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
When a telephone company knowingly becomes involved in the
transmission, however, by producing or advertising the services
for its own pecuniary interest, then liability may attach.65
Because of this FCC determination, a court examining the
satellite or uplink operator's actions must go through two distinct
levels of analysis. Initially, the court must evaluate the common
carrier's adherence to the statutory obligation to avoid editorial
control. Second, the court must evaluate the common carrier's
interest in the transmitted material for determination of any
pecuniary interest, 6  regardless of its inability to exercise this
editorial control. Once a common carrier has passed these two
evaluations, arguably federal liability would not attach even if
the broadcast was otherwise illegal. The indictments against
GTE, USSC, and GTE Spacenet, however, indicate that the
evaluation precluding federal liability is not enough. The court
would have to conduct a final investigation to determine whether
the federal common carrier requirements have a preemptive
effect over state obscenity law.
State Regulation in Light of the Federal Common Carrier
Requirements
The breadth of state regulation depends on whether the federal
common carrier requirements take precedence over contrary
state law when the state law defines and prohibits obscenity.
The Supreme Court has recently considered this question in the
case of Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp:67
[C]onsideration of that question is guided by familiar and well-
established principles. Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const.,
Art. VI, cl. 2, the enforcement of a state regulation may be
pre-empted by federal law in several circumstances: first, when
agency against any common carrier ... on account of-
(B) any access permitted-
(i) in good faith reliance upon the lack of any representation by a provider
of communications that communications provided by that provider are [ob-
scene or indecent], or
(ii) because a specific representation by the provider did not allow the
carrier, acting in good faith, a sufficient period to restrict access to [those]
communications.
65. Memorandum Opinion, Declaratory Ruling and Order, 1987 FCC LEXIS at *10.
66. Pecuniary interest in the material being transmitted here is distinguished from
pecuniary interest in the transmission itself. Liability may arise from a pecuniary interest
in the material.
67. 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
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Congress, in enacting a federal statute, has expressed a clear
intent to pre-empt state law; second, when it is clear, despite
the absence of explicit pre-emptive language, that Congress
has intended, by legislating comprehensively, to occupy an
entire field of regulation and has thereby "left no room for
the States to supplement" federal law; and, finally, when com-
pliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
And, as we made clear . . . "Federal regulations have no less
pre-emptive effect than federal statutes. '68
In Capital Cities Cable, the Court dealt with FCC regulations69
conflicting with a state prohibition on broadcast advertisement
of alcoholic beverages. The Court addressed the question of
whether Congress intended the federal scheme to preempt totally
any state regulation in the area. 0
Federal common carrier requirements generally take prece-
dence over contrary state law. In Capital Cities Cable, however,
a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that a cable company's federal
mandate to carry local broadcasting took precedence not only
over Oklahoma state law, but also over an Oklahoma state con-
stitutional provision prohibiting television stations from broad-
casting alcoholic beverage commercials.7 1  The Oklahoma
constitutional provision was otherwise authorized pursuant to a
federal constitutional provision, the Twenty-first Amendment' 2
68. Id. at 698-99 (holding that FCC regulations preempt contrary state constitutional
provision restricting the ability of television broadcasters to carry alcoholic beverage
advertisements) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) and quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
67 (1941)).
69. The FCC regulations involved in this case required the cable company, in exchange
for the right to rebroadcast distant broadcast signals without negotiating specific royalties
with each royalty owner of material rebroadcast, to pay into a royalty fund and to refrain
from exercising any editorial control over the signal being rebroadcast. Id.
70. Id. at 713-14 ("In this case . . . we must resolve a clash between an express federal
decision to pre-empt all state regulation of cable signal carriage and a state effort to
apply its ban on alcoholic beverage advertisements to wine commercials contained in out-
of-state signals carried by cable systems.").
71. The Oklahoma state constitutional provision in question read as follows: "It shall
be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage
within the State of Oklahoma, except one sign at the retail outlet bearing the words
'Retail Alcoholic Liquor Store.'" OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII, § 5.
72. "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 (emphasis added).
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which normally confers broad regulatory powers on the states in
contravention of the Commerce Clause: 3
The Oklahoma State Constitution allows the sale but prohibits
the advertising of alcoholic beverages except for certain on-
premises signs.7 4 Oklahoma implemented this prohibition in part
by requiring cable companies to block such advertising when a
local cable television station carried a national television broad-
cast 5 The Court noted that
[s]ince the Oklahoma law, by requiring deletion of a portion of
. ..out-of-state signals [the F.C.C. clearly encouraged the cable
companies to carry], compels conduct that federal law forbids,
the State ban clearly "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives" of the
federal regulatory scheme.7 6
Courts can draw a distinction, however, in addition to the
question of the medium, between Capital Cities Cable and the
American Exxxtasy Channel cases. The broadcasting of advertis-
ing for alcoholic beverages is protected speech,77 whereas ob-
scenity is not.78 The Court may have been more comfortable
finding a preemptive effect in defense of protected speech than
it will be in the defense of nonprotected speech.79
73. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 697. The Commerce Clause states that "[tihe
Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8.
The Court found that the regulatory scheme was not a direct consequence of the
Twenty-first Amendment, although the regulatory scheme was clearly pursuant to this
Amendment. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 716 ("[Tlhe State's central power under the
Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the times, places, and manner under which liquor
may be imported and sold is not directly implicated.").
74. Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 694. For the text of the relevant constitutional
provision, see supra note 71.
The ban did not apply to advertisements in the print media, "principally because of
the practical difficulties of enforcement." Capital Cities Cable, 467 U.S. at 695.
75. Id. at 694-95. The national broadcasters gave the local affiliates ample notification
of the upcoming advertisements. Id. at 695 n.2.
76. Id. at 706 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
77. E.g. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (holding that contra-
ceptive advertisement is lawful commercial speech). The statement that commercial speech
is constitutionally protected of course must be conditioned on the speech not being subject
to another form of prohibition that would take it outside the confines of constitutional
protection. This loss of constitutional protection would occur if the advertisement was
also obscene. Such was the case in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971), in which
the defendant was convicted upon proof that he had mailed a commercial advertisement
later adjudicated to be obscene.
78. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
79. Note that the speech involved in the American Exxxtasy Channel cases may not
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Congressional enactments involving cable mandatory-access
channels and cases interpreting these statutes provide further
evidence of this preemptive rule. A mandatory-access channel is
a common-carrier channel on franchised cable systems. Congress
requires the mandatory-access channels on any cable system
offering more than thirty-six channels ° and offers immunity from
prosecution under state obscenity laws for programming that is
aired on the mandatory-access channels. 81 Congress prohibits ca-
ble operators, like satellite operators on common carrier trans-
ponders, from exercising editorial control over the programming
on these mandatory-access channels. 82 Finally, the federal statutes
controlling mandatory-access channels explicitly and specifically
preempt state obscenity laws.83
have been unprotected. The Governor of New York, for example, refused extradition of
the principals of HDOS partially on the grounds that the" communication was not adju-
dicated obscene in New York. See Verhovek, supra note 17.
80. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C.A. § 521-559 (West 1991),
requires cable operators that provide 36 or more activated channels to designate a
percentage of those channels for commercial use by persons unaffiliated with the operator.
Id. § 532.
81. See id. § 558 (declaring cable operators not liable for obscenity broadcast on § 532
cable channels); see also Meyerson, supra note 52, at 172-73 (suggesting a reconciliation
of the latter two statutory provisions). Compare 47 U.S.C.A. § 559 (making it a federal
offense to transmit obscene material over a cable system) ith id. S 544 (allowing a cable
franchising authority to specify under what conditions obscene material may be shown
over a cable system).
82. (c) Use of channel capacity by unaffiliated persons; editorial control; restric-
tion on service
(1) If a person unaffiliated with the cable operator seeks to use channel
capacity designated pursuant to subsection (b) of this section for commercial
use, the cable operator shall establish, consistent with the purpose of this
section, the price, terms, and conditions of such use which are at least
sufficient to assure that such use will not adversely affect the operation,
financial condition, or market development of the cable system.
(2) A cable operator shall not exercise any editorial control over any video
programming provided pursuant to this section, or in any other way consider
the content of such programming, except that an operator may consider such
content to the minimum extent necessary to establish a reasonable price for
the commercial use of designated channel capacity by an unaffiliated person.
47 U.S.C.A. § 532(c).
83. Nothing in [the Cable Act] shall be deemed to affect the criminal or civil
liability of cable programmers or cable operators pursuant to the Federal,
State, or local law of libel, slander, obscenity, incitement, invasions of privacy,
false or misleading advertising, or other similar laws, except that cable
operators shall not incur any such liability for any program carried on any
channel designated for public, educational, governmental use or on any other
channel obtained under section 532 of this title or under similar arrange-
ments.
Id- 5 558.
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Federal courts recently interpreted these provisions in Playboy
Enterprises v. Public Service Commission.84 In that case, the
United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico
granted a permanent injunction against the Public Service Com-
mission of Puerto Rico (the Commission) preventing the Commis-
sion from sanctioning cable operators for the transmission of
allegedly obscene materials on mandatory-access channels. 5 The
Commission threatened to sanction cable operators for obscenity
if they failed to drop the Playboy Channel86 from their cable
service.8 7 The court relied on the explicit preemption provisions
of the Federal Cable Act of 198488 to preclude the Commission
from prosecuting the cable operators for obscenity. The court
did not address whether the Commission could prosecute Playboy
Enterprises as an originator of programming rather than as a
cable operator.89
Federal broadcast law does not contain any such preemption.
In fact, the law specifically states that no preemptive effect is
to take place.9" Regardless of this provision, preemption results
from a conflict between state and federal law. This conflict makes
enforcement of one law impossible in light of the enforcement of
the other, at least in reference to obscenity transmitted over
direct broadcast satellites. 91
Cable operators held an analogous position before 1978, when
FCC rules made cable operators liable for obscene and indecent
84. 698 F. Supp. 401 (D.P.R. 1988), modified, 906 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 388 (1990).
85. Id. at 419.
86. HDOS also broadcast the Tuxxedo Channel, the companion to the Exxxtasy Channel.
The content of the Tuxxedo Channel has been compared to that of the Playboy Channel.
See Verhovek, supra note 17. The Tuxxedo Channel was not the subject of any indictment
or information.
87. As a result of the threats, at the time of the suit all but one cable operator dropped
the Playboy Channel from their cable services.
88. 47 U.S.C.A. S 558 (West 1991). The relevant provisions are reprinted supra note
83.
89. Language in the Act, however, indicated that the cable programmer-the producer
of the material being shown on the cable mandatory access channel-was not explicitly
excluded from liability. See id.
90. See 18 U.S.C.A. S 1468(c) (West Supp. 1991) (relevant provisions reprinted supra
note 26); see also Community Television v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (N.D. Utah
1982) ("Pacifica, which deals with broadcasting, the transmission of electromagnetic radio
waves through the publicly controlled airways, is not applicable [to cable television] ....
It is irrelevant."), quoted in Karl A. Groskaufmanis, What Films We May Watch: Videotape
Distribution and the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1283 (1988).
91. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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programming on mandatory-access channels.9 2 According to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Midwest
Video Corp. v. FCC,93 the rules in existence "created a corps of
involuntary government surrogates [to carry out otherwise pro-
hibited censoring operations], but without providing the proce-
dural safeguards respecting 'prior restraint' required of the
government."94 Failing to find a preemptive effect for direct
broadcast satellite owners would be inconsistent with the analo-
gous position cable operators held.
If the courts allowed the prosecution of a satellite owner for
obscene material broadcast over common carrier satellite trans-
ponders, the satellite owner would have little choice but to
maintain a constant surveillance of the transmissions to ensure
that the programs being broadcast did not offend any community
standard for obscenity within the satellite's broadcast footprint.95
A cadre of private, rather than governmental, censors with the
obligation to expurgate materials to avoid potential liability con-
ceivably would enforce this minimum level of community toler-
ance, 9 which this Note refers to as the lowest common
denominator national obscenity standardY7
Courts have found that the pre-1978 FCC rules presented cable
companies with irreconcilable pressure from two sides:
When the cable operator, in policing his access channels, is
considering whether an access user is being or has been "ob-
scene" or "indecent," or whether access should be denied for
any reason, there are ghosts in the wings. On one side lurks
a fear of violating the Commission's rules, and potential loss
of his "Certificate of Compliance." On the other stands the
92. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1056-57 (8th Cir. 1978), affd on other
grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The FCC used the existence of a national market as a basis
for regulation of the cable television industry. The court in Midwest Video held the FCC
regulations unconstitutional: "Broadcast signals are being used as a basic component in
the establishment of cable systems, and it is therefore appropriate that the fundamental
goals of a national communications structure be furthered by cable . ..." Id. at 1043
(emphasis added) (quoting Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190, afi'd,
36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972)). Apparently, for the purposes of an obscenity standard, the FCC
did not equate the national market with a national community.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1056.
95. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
96. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 735-38 (1978) (plurality opinion) (describing
the history of the FCC authorizing statutes allowing for after-the-fact sanctioning but
prohibiting a prior censorship role for the FCC).
97. See supra note 50.
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potential for violation of the access user's rights. . . . [C]able
operators [are exposed] to law suits [brought] by access users
claiming prior restraint of their First Amendment rights, ...
by the state for his having transmitted obscene material, by
outraged subscribers (whether outraged by obscenity or out-
raged by having to pay for it) or by persons denied access for
any reason .... 98
The FCC rules sanctioning cable operators for indecency or
obscenity on mandatory-access channels were, for this reason,
irreconcilable with the mandatory nature of those same channels.
Courts have found such FCC rules unenforceable in reference to
cable operators.9 Similarly, the courts should find the analogous
FCC rules as applied to common carrier satellite owners irrec-
oncilable with the mandatory nature of the satellite system100
LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR OBSCENITY STANDARD
The satellite owner may escape criminal liability for dissemi-
nation of allegedly obscene material over common carrier trans-
ponders, but the producer and the uplink operators of the material
may still be at risk for borderline'01 obscene materials. Although
only a single locality within the satellite's broadcast footprint
may consider certain material obscene, liability for broadcasting
that material in an unscrambled form may chill the broadcast for
the entire area, an area potentially as large as the entire conti-
nental United States.102 This scenario illustrates the problem of
the lowest common denominator obscenity standard. 03
98. Midwest Video Corp., 571 F.2d at 1058 (footnote omitted).
99. Id.
100. Actually, such rules are not essential to the prevention of use of common carrier
transponders for illegal purposes. Under present rules, prosecutors may seek indictments
against operators who knowingly transmit communications pursuant to an illegal purpose.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text. If these operators knowingly advanced illegal
actions other than the transmission of obscenity, conceivably they would be liable under
the statutes that make those actions illegal.
101. This Note uses the term "borderline obscene" to refer to material that may
reasonably be considered obscene in one community although merely sexually oriented
or "adult" material in another. The distributor of borderline obscene material must take
care to disseminate the material only in those communities in which the material is not
considered legally obscene. See supra notes 59-60 and infra notes 137-39 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the mens rea required for liability for distribution of borderline
obscene materials to communities that would find the materials legally obscene.
102. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
103. The Supreme Court accepts the existence of a lowest common denominator
[Vol. 33:949
1992] OBSCENITY IN THE AGE OF DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE 967
The 1982 Supreme Court case-New York v. Ferber'04 provides
a stark example of the possible problems a nationwide distributor
faces under a lowest common denominator obscenity standard.10 5
At the time of Ferber, twenty states prohibited the distribution
of materials depicting sexually explicit child-content 1 6 regardless
of whether the material was obscene; fifteen states prohibited
distribution only if the material was considered obscene; two
states prohibited distribution only if the material was obscene
only as to minors; and twelve states prohibited only the use of
minors in the production of the materials.10 Furthermore, at least
fifteen states placed the line dividing children and adults at age
eighteen; four states at age seventeen; sixteen states at age
sixteen; two states at age sixteen or of one who appeared to be
prepubescent; one state defined a child as an individual who was
or appeared to be under sixteen; and one state prescribed dif-
ferent penalties for child pornography depending upon the dif-
ferent ages of children involved. 10 8 This listing does not even
obscenity standard:
The use of "national" standards . necessarily implies that materials found
tolerable in some places, but not under the "national" criteria, will never-
theless be unavailable where they are acceptable. Thus, in terms of danger
to free expression, the potential for suppression seems at least as great in
the application of a single nationwide standard as in allowing distribution in
accordance with local tastes.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973); see also Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("If [the radio station's] audience is comprised of different
communities with different local standards, [that radio station] ultimately bears the burden
of complying with the prohibition on obscene messages.").
104. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
105. The Court, in upholding Ferber's conviction, found the statute prohibiting the
distribution of child pornography valid under the First Amendment and not overly broad.
Id-
106. "Child-content" in this context refers to materials directed to adults that contained
portrayals of children regardless of the actual age of the models portraying those children.
107. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin prohibited the distribution of materials depicting
sexually explicit child-content regardless of whether the material was obscene. Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington prohibited distribution of child-
content material only if the material was considered obscene. Connecticut and Virginia
prohibited distribution of this material only if the material was obscene only as to minors.
Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, and Wyoming prohibited only the use of minors in the production of such
materials. Id at 749-50 n.2.
108. Id. at 764 n.17. The 16 states that defined a child as a person under 18 years old
were Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia,
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begin to address the issue of the materials each state considered
obscene.
To protect against personal liability under a lower common
denominator obscenity standard, the producer of pornographic
material using a young "model" had to comply with the lowest
common denominator child obscenity statutes for states in which
the producer distributes the material. The producer of borderline
obscene sexually explicit materials faces analogous problems.
Courts, however, must delineate exactly what actions a state
may take constitutionally in proscribing obscenity to determine
exactly the dangers that await these producers.
CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES ON THE REGULATION OF OBSCENITY
A state may proscribe obscene materials without offending the
United States Constitution. As the Supreme Court proclaimed in
Roth v. Unites States,"9 "[O]bscen[e] [materials are] not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press."110 The range
of materials states may proscribe as obscene is not restricted to
permanent writings or impressions. A state may forbid the dis-
tribution and possession outside of the home of obscene moving
pictures, for example, even though the films consist only of
celluloid such that light projected through would produce pictures
on an otherwise blank screen."' Some states have even taken
steps to prohibit specific mechanical devices as obscene." 2
and Wisconsin. The four states that defined a child as a person under 17 years old were
Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas. The 15 states that defined a child as a person
under the age of 16 were Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Mary-
land, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, and South Dakota. The two states that defined a child as one who is
under 16 or who appeared to be prepubescent were Illinois and Nebraska. The one state
that defined a child as an individual who was or appeared to be under the age of 16 was
Indiana. The one state that prescribed different penalties for child pornography depending
upon the different ages of the children involved was Kentucky. Id. at 764 n.17 (citing
T.C. Donnelly, Note, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward Constitu-
tional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 295, 307 n.71 (1979)). In Ferber,
the Court apparently did not notice that, although the Note claimed 16 states defined a
child as one who is under 16, the Note listed only 15 states.
109. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
110. Id. at 485.
111. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (addressing images on eight-
millimeter film); People v. Enskat, 98 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Ct. App. 1971), afftd on other grounds,
109 Cal. Rptr. 433 (Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 937 (1974) (applying the best
evidence rule of CAL. EviD. CODE S 1500 (West 1973), to motion pictures in an obscenity
case).
112. See, e.g., Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), discussed in
Randolph N. Wisener, Case Note, Criminal Law-Obscenity-State Police Powers Justify
968 [Vol. 33:949
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Although "mere private possession of obscene matter [within
the home] cannot constitutionally be made a crime," 113 states may
constitutionally proscribe distribution of obscene materials, even
for use in the home. 114 Assuming, that "[s]tates have a legitimate
interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene
material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a sig-
nificant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling reci-
pients or of exposure to juveniles,"11 5 a state may regulate most
aspects of the dissemination of obscene material. A state may
regulate the distribution," 6 importation, 117 acquisition," 8 or
transportation" 9 of obscene materials. A state may also consti-
tutionally proscribe the viewing of obscene materials shown within
an enclosed theater to consenting adults. 120 A state may even
prohibit the distribution of obscene materials produced outside
the state of prosecution.'2 '
the Legislative Proscription and Criminalization of the Sale or Promotion of Devices Which
are Designed or Manufactured for the Purpose of Stimulating Human Genital Organs, 17
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1125, 1138-45 (1986).
113. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 559.
114. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 307 (1977) ("[The individual's right to
possess obscene material in the privacy of his home, however, d[oes] not create a
correlative right to receive, transport, or distribute the material."); United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (determining that the prohibition of transporting obscene
material in interstate commerce applies to nonpublic as well as to public transportation);
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (upholding
statute prohibiting the importation of obscene materials even if the materials were for
private possession and use); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973)
("[Clommerce in obscene material is unprotected by any constitutional doctrine of pri-
vacy."); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 375 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (upholding statute prohibiting the importation of obscene materials as applied to
materials imported for commercial use); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355-56
(1971) (holding that a statute prohibiting the use of the mails for the delivery of obscene
materials is constitutional as applied to individuals delivering materials to willing adult
recipients).
115. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (footnote omitted).
116. Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592 (1970) (concerning a bookseller); see also Reidel, 402
U.S. at 356 (regulating the mailing of obscenity through the mails, held constitutional in
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), not affected by the subsequent decision in
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)); Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 500-
18 (1962) (Brennan, J., concurring).
117. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 128; Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. at 376 (White, J.).
118. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 126.
119. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 141-42 (1973); see also Groskaufmanis, supra
note 90, at 1291; cases cited supra note 114.
120. "Nothing, however, in this Court's decisions intimates that there is any 'funda-
mental' privacy right 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' to watch obscene movies
in places of public accommodation:' Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66
(1973).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1971) (upholding a statutory
prohibition of using the mails to send obscene material to willing adults); cf. New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765-76 (1982) (concerning child pornography).
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In adjudicating obscenity, -a fact finder uses a "community
standard" to determine whether particular material is to be
designated obscene. 122 As representatives of the community, the
jury need not refer to any expert testimony to make the deter-
mination.123
Although the Supreme Court applied community standards to
determine obscenity as early as 1957 in Roth v. United States,
124
it did not begin to define the meaning of the term until its
decision in Miller v. California:2 5
Under a National Constitution, fundamental First Amendment
limitations on the powers of the States do not vary from
community to community, but this does not mean that there
are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform national standards of
precisely what appeals to the "prurient interest" or is "patently
offensive." . . . Nothing in the First Amendment requires that
a jury must consider hypothetical and unascertainable "national
standards" when attempting to determine whether certain
materials are obscene as a matter of fact.126
The Court in Miller did not extensively develop the community
concept, but later, in Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,'2 it did
state categorically that the relevant "community" is smaller
geographically than the nation.1 28 Furthermore, the Court stated
the standard had nothing to do with an "average" community."2
The notion that courts should base obscenity determinations
on a community standard rather than a national standard is not
122. An interesting application of the community standard formula appeared in Smith
v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). At the time of the subject offense, the State of
Iowa had no law prohibiting obscenity for adults. The state legislature had not yet passed
a new statute to replace a prior law prohibiting obscenity that had been declared
unconstitutional. Smith was nonetheless convicted of distribution of obscene materials
through the mails-a federal offense-based upon the community standards of a state
having no law restricting the material mailed, even though the materials never left the
state.
123. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 56 (declining to require expert testimony to
establish the community standard).
124. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
125. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
126. Id. at 30-32.
127. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
128. Id. at 124-25. A state may "impose a geographic limit on the determination of
community standards by defining the area from which the jury could be selected in an
obscenity case." Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 303 (1977) (dictum).
129. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 125-26.
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without its detractors. Far from believing "a national 'community
standard' would be an exercise in futility,"'13 Justice Stevens has
stated:
A federal statute defining a criminal offense should prescribe
a uniform standard applicable throughout the country. This
proposition is so obvious that it was not even questioned during
the first 90 years of the enforcement of the Comstock Act [the
early obscenity statute] under which petitioner was prosecuted.
When the reach of the statute is limited by a constitutional
provision, it is even more certain that national uniformity is
appropriate. 13 1
In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 132 Justice Brennan stated: "[T]he constitu-
tional status of an allegedly obscene work must be determined
on the basis of a national standard. It is, after all, a national
Constitution we are expounding."' Regardless of this criticism,
however, the Supreme Court has not deviated from the local
community standard.
A national or regional distributor of borderline obscene mate-
rials thus may constitutionally be subject to different community
standards under federal or state laws. The Supreme Court has
said:
The fact that distributors of allegedlr obscene materials may
be subjected to varying community standards in the various
federal judicial districts into which they transmit the materials
does not render a federal statute unconstitutional because of
the failure of application of uniform national standards of
obscenity. Those same distributors may be subjected to such
varying degrees of criminal liability in prosecutions by the
States for violations of state obscenity statutes; we see no
constitutional impediment to a similar rule for federal prose-
cutions.1 4
130. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (emphasis omitted).
131. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 312 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted); see also Manual Enters. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (Harlan, J., joined by Stewart,
J.), quoted in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg,
J.) ("[A local standard would have] the intolerable consequence of denying some sections
of the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in others might be
considered offensive to prevailing community standards of decency.").
132. 378 U.S. 184.
133. Id. at 195.
134. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974). But see Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at
194 (Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg, J.) ("[To sustain the suppression of a particular
book or film in one locality would deter its dissemination in other localities where it
might be held not obscene, since sellers and exhibitors would be reluctant to risk criminal
conviction in testing the variations between the two places.").
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The Court has not prescribed the exact geographical extent of
the applicable community,135 however, and lower courts have
determined the applicable community according to the type of
media under question. 136
Present law does not require a prosecutor to prove a distrib-
utor knew that any particular community could consider the
material legally obscene to prosecute the distributor for violation
of obscenity distribution laws. If the distributor knew the "char-
acter and nature of the materials," a community that finds the
material obscene can hold liable the distributor who knowingly
conveys the material.1
For many forms of media, this mens rea requirement does not
present undue dangers of liability to the distributor. Companies
engaged in the production and distribution of borderline obscene
materials generally can tailor the distribution network of the
medium involved to address any inconsistencies in the varying
standards of obscenity in different communities.'- No distributor
can know for certain whether the communities to which it pur-
veys its materials will consider the material obscene. The wide
array of sexually explicit material in each market, however, does
allow a distributor to gauge the amount of risk the distributor
135. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 303:
If a State wished to adopt a slightly different approach to obscenity regu-
lation, it might impose a geographic limit on the determination of community
standards by defining the area from which the jury could be selected in an
obscenity case, or by legislating with respect to the instructions that must
be given to the jurors in such cases.
Id.; see also Hamling, 418 U.S. at 105 ("Our holding in Miller that California could
constitutionally proscribe obscenity in terms of a 'statewide' standard did not mean that
any such precise geographic area is required as a matter of constitutional law."). To see
how this has been applied, see Home Box Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987, 999
n.22 (D. Utah 1982) (referring to the Utah Supreme Court's designation of a "community"
as being the county from which the jury is selected for the purposes of a cable obscenity
and indecency statute that the court therein ruled unconstitutionally broad).
136. See infra notes 140-69 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Hamling, 418 U.S. 87:
It is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecution show that a defendant
had knowledge of the contents of the materials he distributed, and that he
knew the character and nature of the materials. To require proof of a
defendant's knowledge of the legal status of the materials would permit the
defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed
up on the law.
Id. at 123.
138. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989) (suggesting that
telephone dial-a-porn services can choose not to serve certain communities or to provide
different messages to different communities).
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would take in sending particular materials to any particular
community.
Distributors of borderline obscene materials often skirt the
edge of criminal law and, thus, assume the risk that their behavior
may be criminal:
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near
each other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line
may be uncertain, but no one can come near it without knowing
that he does so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to
the criminal law to make him take the risk.139
Unless the direct broadcast satellite transmission is a distinctive
media form, broadcasters of borderline obscene materials should
be held to the same risk for violations of community standards
for any broadcast received in the satellite footprint as would the
distributor of sexually explicit material utilizing another medium
type.
The ability to regulate the communication depends partially
upon the nature of the medium.140 For example, if the medium is
139. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930), quoted with approval in
Hamling, 418 U.S. at 124.
140. "We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special First
Amendment problems." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (plurality opinion);
see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952):
Nor does it follow [from the decision that motion picture regulation is subject
to the Free Speech Clause] that motion pictures are necessarily subject to
the precise rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each
method tends to present its own peculiar problems. But the basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command,
do not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by
this Court, make freedom of expression the rule. There is no justification in
this case for making an exception to that rule.
Id. at 503 (holding that motion picture regulation is subject to the terms of the First
Amendment and that a finding that the film is sacrilegious is not sufficient to ban that
film); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984):
[C]ommunication of this kind [public broadcasting] is entitled to the most
exacting degree of First Amendment protection. Were a similar ban on
editorializing applied to newspapers and magazines, we would not hesitate
to strike it down as violative of the First Amendment. But . . . because
broadcast regulation involves unique considerations, our cases have not
followed precisely the same approach that we have applied to other media
and have never gone so far as to demand that such regulations serve
.compelling' governmental interests.
Id. at 375-76 (citations omitted); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969) (upholding the FCC fairness doctrine: "[Differences in the characteristics of new
media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."), quoted in
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readily accessible to children, that accessibility affects the ability
of the government to regulate.' 4' Regulation is also different
depending upon the reception point of the message 42 and on the
availability of the communication.
Even if a particular medium requires "affirmative steps to
receive the communication,"' 4 3 the transmitter and developer-
as well as the receiver-of the communication generally are liable
for its content. 4 4 States regulate both the production and dissem-
ination of potentially obscene material and thus determine ob-
scenity at the source of the communication. 45 States also regulate
the transfer of potentially obscene material and thus determine
obscenity at the reception point of the communication. 46 It fol-
lows, therefore, that either or both the state of broadcast and
the state of reception may hold the broadcaster of the movie
liable, depending only upon whether either or both states consider
the movie obscene.147
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 377. According to the Enbanc Programming Inquiry:
[Wihile a nudist magazine may be within the protection of the First Amend-
ment . . . the televising of nudes might well raise a serious question of
programming contrary to 18 U.S.C. 1464 .... Similarly, regardless of whether
the "4-letter words" and sexual description, set forth in "lady Chatterly's
Lover," (when considered in the context of the whole book) make the book
obscene for mailability purposes, the utterance of such words or the depiction
of such sexual activity on radio or TV would raise similar public interest
and section 1464 questions.
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960), quoted in Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 n.16. See generally Michael
Bauman, Note, This is the Picture-If You Don't Like It, Turn It Off. The Futility of
Setting Cable Specific Obscenity Standards, 8 CARDOzo ARTs & ENT. 611 (1990).
141. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 130-31 (holding unconstitutional a statute's
denial of adult access to telephone dial-a-porn messages that were not readily accessible
to minors); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 63643 (1968) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the sale to minors of magazines deemed obscene in relation to children but
not obscene in relation to adults). But cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)
(striking down a statute prohibiting general dissemination of a book deemed obscene in
relation to children but not obscene in relation to adults).
142. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 127-28 (comparing the regulation of inde-
cency in dial-a-porn services in the case at bar with the regulation of indecency in radio
broadcasts in Pacif-wa).
143. Id.
144. The limit to this liability, of course, is the extent of knowing participation. Should
a receiver fraudulently receive a communication in such a way as to subject that
communication to a determination of obscenity, and the broadcaster was not reckless in
his actions, courts would probably not hold the broadcaster liable.
145. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977) (allowing federal prosecution based
on intrastate dissemination).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354-55 (1971) (concerning receipt
of obscene materials through the mail).
147. Although a distributor of pornographic materials may be held liable in any state
through which the material travels if the material is in physical form, the same may not
be said for broadcast materials as long as the broadcast cannot be received and converted
into intelligible form in an intervening state.
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The combined effect of these factors is that regulation has
taken different forms for different media types. 148 The distinctive
nature of each media type accounts for differing methods of
regulation for obscenity. Distinctions between different media
forms include whether the receiver is active or passive in re-
ceiving the communication; 49 whether the communication is in
an intelligible or material form;ee and whether the distributor
has the ability to screen the potential audience.
Telephone dial-a-porn services and phone companies can easily
channel callers by the originating area code' 5 ' or by the age152 of
the caller. Furthermore, the communication is caller-initiated.
Attempts at scrambling the telephone messages so that they
may be received by descrambling devices made available only to
adults has not proven generally effective at restricting access to
minors as have efforts to restrict calls to "900" area code and
"976" or "970" prefix telephone numbers.jc3
148. "Each method of communicating ideas is a 'law unto itself' and that law must
reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method." Metromedia,
Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
149. The viewer of a rented video cassette recorder (VCR) tape must actively seek out
and procure that tape whereas a radio listener may inadvertently and passively receive
a particular radio broadcast. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (plurality
opinion).
150. "Intelligible" and "material" refer to the characteristics of the signal or commu-
nicative medium. A video cassette tape, for example, requires a simple and readily
accessible device, a video cassette recorder (VCR), to reproduce the images contained
thereon which a state could adjudicate obscene. A prospective audience needs no additional
or special access, however, to procure the images. Anyone with a VCR would have access
to the images contained on the video cassette tape. This scenario is distinguishable from
a scrambled cable television "premium channel" signal that requires the additional positive
step of subscribing to the cable premium service to make the otherwise unintelligible
signal viewable.
151. Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 125-26 (discussing the ability of the telephone
company to provide operators or mechanical screening devices to block access to messages
from certain areas); see also Carlin Communications, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) ("976 [telephone] service differs from ordinary
broadcasting in that listeners must take deliberate steps to hear the particular kinds of
messages they choose:'), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988). But see id. at 1297 n.6
("Depending on whether Carlin's messages are legally obscene, Mountain Bell [Telephone]
could still face criminal liability for carrying Carlin's messages. . . .Some self-censorship
is an inevitable result of all obscenity laws.").
152. Requiring the caller to provide a credit card or requiring prepayment and screening
are two methods that would allow for screening by age. See Sable Communications, 492
U.S. at 121-22, 128.
153. Id. A service whereby a telephone subscriber can have the telephone company
block calls from the subscriber's phone to certain prefixes, called voluntary blocking,
apparently has also failed in effectively screening children from sexually explicit telephone
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A video cassette recorder (VCR) tape exists in intelligible,
material form during transportation and delivery.' 14 Communities
thus hold responsible anyone knowingly distributing legally ob-
scene material in video cassette form.15 The immediate distrib-
utors, video cassette rental and sales agents, dealing directly
with the consuming public, have the ability to screen customers
by age. Once the video cassette is beyond the confines of the
store, however, distributors are powerless to confine the viewing
public to a particular locality or audience. 5 6
A movie shown in a theater is also in intelligible, material
form during transportation and delivery. Communities therefore
hold responsible anyone knowingly distributing legally obscene
material in this form. 157 The immediate distributors -theater
owners-have the ability to screen customers by age. The theater
owner, however, has more control over the age and tolerance of
the audience than does the immediate distributor of the video
cassette because the video cassette goes directly into the hands
of the audience, whereas the theater movie itself is never within
the immediate control of the audience.
A computer program located on a disk is also in intelligible,
material form during the transportation and delivery stages.
Computer network operators have the ability to screen obscene
materials from networks accessible by telephone linkages in the
same manner as are regular telephone communications.'
Pornographic material in print, either pictorially or textually,
is in intelligible, material form requiring no intervening mechan-
messages. According to the court in Dial Information Services Corp. v. Thornburgh, 938
F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 1992 U.S. LEXIS (Jan. 27, 1992), "only four percent
of the 4.6 million residential telephone lines in the area having access to the 970 prefix
assigned by the telephone company for adult messages ha[d] been blocked" despite the
fact that the service was free and in place for over two years. Id. at 1542. Only "half of
the residential households in New York [were] aware of either the availability of dial-a-
porn or of blocking," id. (emphasis added), however, so the statistic cited by the court
may not be as much an indicator of the lack of effectiveness of the method itself as it is
an indicator of the lack of effectiveness of the advertisement thereof.
154. For a discussion of how a VCR is distinguishable from other forms of communi-
cation and its impact on the First Amendment, see Groskaufmanis, supra note 90, at
1284-93.
155. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 13A-12-200.2 (Supp. 1990) (reprinted supra note 22).
156. Cf. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973)
("[W]e should note that it is extremely difficult to control the uses to which obscene
material is put .... Even single copies . . . can be quickly and cheaply duplicated by
modern technology thus facilitating wide-scale distribution.").
157. See, e.g., ALA. CODE S 13A-12-200.2 (reprinted supra note 22); see also Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
158. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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ical device for interpretation. Communities hold responsible any-
one knowingly distributing legally obscene material in this form.
A distributor cannot realistically guarantee either that adoles-
cents will not view the material or that an adult purchaser will
not transport the sexually explicit printed material to a com-
munity not tolerant enough to accept the material. Legal pur-
chasers can readily redistribute the material to minors or transport
it to other communities without the immediate distributor's con-
sent or knowledge. 15 9
The radio broadcast is in intelligible but nonmaterial form
during its delivery stage. Radio broadcasting is limited in distri-
butional area by the power of the broadcast and by natural
obstacles. 60 The broadcast area often encompasses substantially
less than one full "community" for the purposes of community
standards. 16 Radio broadcasting is pervasive 62 and is not suitable
to scrambling16e Radio broadcasting stations, further, are subject
to licensure.'6
The television broadcast is in intelligible but nonmaterial form
during its delivery stage. Television broadcasting is limited in
distributional area, much in the same way radio is limited. It is
also pervasive and not suitable for scrambling. Teldvision broad-
cast stations are similarly subject to licensure 65
159. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 58 n.7 (contrasting the abilities of adult
theaters and adult bookstores to control their audiences).
This observation does not intimate that the state can hold liable the immediate
distributor who sells material that eventually is found obscene in another locality if the
immediate distributor has no knowledge of the subsequent distribution or transportation,
nor has any reason to believe that any subsequent distribution or transportation is to
take place without the distributor's consent.
160. This Note does not attempt to address in the present context the problems arising
from the fact that some wave spillage occurs which allows a broadcast signal to be
accessed beyond the immediate boundaries of a single nation. For some of the implications
of this predicament, see TAISHOFF, supra note 13, at 8-9.
161. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concerning a
broadcast medium not able to specifically target the audience, but able to tailor broadcast
standards for the local region).
162. Id. at 748.
163. Although a radio broadcast conceivably could be scrambled, given the limited
broadcast range, market forces would probably not allow for scrambling.
164. See infra note 165 (concerning the analogous licensure of television broadcast
stations).
165. The Supreme Court found spectrum scarcity to be important to the ability to
license television stations, given that the licensees "must serve in a sense as fiduciaries
for the public by presenting 'those views and voices which are representative of [their]
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.'"
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969)). The concept of spectrum scarcity has been
increasingly discredited given the state of modern technology. See Groskaufmanis, supra
note 90, at 1276-79.
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The cable signal is in intelligible but nonmaterial form during
its delivery stage.'66 The signal is distinguishable from the direct
broadcast signal in that the former requires the intervention of
a "community receiver, '16 7 whereas the latter is a more "focused"
signal, which allows for reception by smaller, individually owned
satellite dishes.'6 Cable operators- comprising a regulated gov-
ernment-sanctioned monopoly serving a particular community-
utilize valuable public resources in the transmission of services. 169
Cable television broadcasters, limited to the area of a community
encompassing the cable company franchise, can tailor the general
content of their distribution for the particular community served
by the cable company's franchise.
The scrambled and unscrambled direct broadcast satellite sig-
nal is distinctive when compared to any other media type. This
distinctive nature of the direct broadcast satellite signal obligates
a fresh look at the regulation of obscenity.
The direct broadcast signal is dissimilar to the radio broadcast
or cable television signal in that the distributional area encom-
passes numerous "communities."'170 The signal is less intelligible,
especially in jts scrambled form, because it requires, in addition
to the now-pervasive television, the intervention of a satellite
dish for reception and a "descrambler" for interpretation. 7' The
scrambled form additionally requires a "password," a decoder
166. Cable companies generally send out the entire signal spectrum to all cable
subscribers. The cable companies filter, or scramble, the channels for which the customer
has not paid.
167. TAISHOFF, supra note 13, at 4.
168. RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 14, at 6-7.
169. See Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). Scrambled cable broadcasts differ from scrambled
satellite broadcasts in that the former must utilize public by-ways for the dissemination
of its message:
A newspaper may reach its audience simply through the public streets or
mails, with no more disruption to the public domain than would be caused
by the typical pedestrian, motorists, or user of the mails. But a cable operator
must lay the means of his medium underground or string it across poles in
order to deliver his message. Obviously, this manner of using the public
domain entails significant disruption, especially to streets, alleys and other
public ways. Some form of permission from the government must, by neces-
sity, precede such disruptive use of the public domain.
Id. at 1377-78.
170. Taishoff explains: "[O]ne appropriately equipped geostationary satellite can contin-
uously transmit and receive electronagraphic signals to and from over 40 per cent of the
earth's surface." TAISHOFF, supra note 13, at 4; see supra notes 160-69 and accompanying
text (discussing the limited distribution area of radio and television broadcasts and of
cable signals).
171. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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activation signal. Unlike a computer network, 172 this activation
signal is broadcast by the distributor, not by the receiver. 173 The
direct broadcast signal, finally, is not subject to redistribution
without the active, generally illegal, intervention of the cable
viewer. This Note next addresses these distinctions and the
complications of regulating obscenity.
Unscrambled Direct Broadcast Satellite Transmissions
The size of the relevant community and the intervention of
the satellite dish are the major distinguishing features of the
direct satellite transmission in an unscrambled form. The tech-
nical aspects of the direct broadcast satellite precludes targetting
a broadcast to a single locale unlike movies shown in theaters
which can be targetted to carefully selected and narrowly defined
areas. The transmission is very similar to broadcast television
or radio transmissions in that the receiver receives and interprets
the communication with the aid of a readily available mechanical
device. Any individual who is financially capable of purchasing a
satellite dish is able to receive the communication. The distributor
cannot "screen" any particular reception of the communication
within the broadcast footprint. Much like the radio or television
transmission, then, the distributor can be liable for any unscram-
bled obscene transmission within the broadcast footprint.
The responsibility for transmission via unscrambled direct
broadcast satellite transmission is dissimilar to that for radio or
broadcast television because the relevant community is larger.
Just as courts determine the relevant community for a television
or radio broadcast by the location and strength of the transmitter,
so should they determine the relevant community for unscram-
bled direct broadcast satellite transmission by the location and
strength of the satellite. 74 The result is potential liability for
lower levels of pornographic broadcasts, based on the lowest
common denominator obscenity standard in the broadcast foot-
print.7 5
An individual wishing to receive the direct broadcast satellite
transmission must also own a satellite dish, presently not a
pervasive home "appliance." The initial scarcity and later per-
vasiveness of the radio and television set, however, demonstrate
172. See supra text accompanying note 158.
173. Prospectus, supra note 9, at 1.
174. The orbital location of a satellite determines its footprint and thus the relevant
community for an unscrambled direct broadcast satellite transmission. Id.
175. See supra notes 50 and 101-03 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
lowest common denominator obscenity standard.
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the minimal role this consideration should take in the develop-
ment of a constitutional theory governing direct broadcast sat-
ellite.
Given a situation such as the present American Exxxtasy
Channel cases 17 6 and discounting the need for a satellite dish to
receive the broadcasts, if a broadcaster does not scramble a
signal, a local community could declare the transmissions obscene
and subject the originator and broadcaster to liability.177 This
single community's reaction would effectively deter the distrib-
utors from broadcasting the material at all. Regardless of the
tolerance of different localities in the United States for a film's
content, the lowest common denominator obscenity standard of
a local community would set the standard for the nation. Mont-
gomery County, Alabama, as well as any other community within
the satellite's broadcast footprint, would have the power to
proscribe the materials from being broadcast on that medium
anywhere in the United States.
Scrambled Direct Broadcast Satellite Transmissions
Once the broadcast is scrambled, however, the analysis be-
comes somewhat different. Initially, a court would have to deter-
mine the applicable relevant community based on the dissemination
range of subscriptions to the broadcast service. Second, a court
would have to address the question of whether the scrambled
signal itself is outside obscenity regulation altogether because
the unintelligible, scrambled signal deserves protection otherwise
not given to an intelligible, unscrambled signal.
Relevant Community Analysis for Scrambled Direct Broadcast
Signal Transmissions
The disseminator of a scrambled direct broadcast signal has
the ability to control the reception of the programming by way
of the scrambling/descrambling process. The broadcaster of a
scrambled signal dictates who is eligible to receive the signal by
sending the unique decoder signature of the receiver along with
the signal.178 If an individual owns a decoding device but has not
176. See supra notes 3-47 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 53-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of why liability
would be restricted to the originator of the programming if the program was carried
over a common carrier satellite transponder.
178. Prospectus, supra note 9, at 1.
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subscribed to a particular service, that service will not transmit
the decoding device's signature with the broadcast, and the
individual will not be able to descramble the signal. 179 In contrast,
cable companies receive a scrambled signal via satellite, descram-
ble the signals, and place filters near the reception point to
screen out nonsubscribers s0 Computer networks give an access
code to subscribers to gain entry to a protected program. Once
made public to one subscriber, that subscriber can easily transfer
the access to nonsubscribers. 81
Because the broadcaster of the direct broadcast satellite trans-
mission has this control over the distribution of the scrambled
signal, the broadcaster can avoid liability for borderline obscene
material by restricting access to subscribers living in communities
tolerant of the material being programmed.18 2 The broadcaster
can further restrict reception to subscribers living in communities
tolerating some, but not all, of the broadcast transmissions.83
The distributor can make the decision either to broadcast or to
restrict the reception of certain broadcasts on the same basis as
a decision to distribute a magazine.
The individual purchasing a pornographic magazine in a com-
munity tolerant of the magazine's level of pornography may easily
copy and redistribute the printed material to a different com-
munity that is not as tolerant. Conversely, any redistributor of
satellite programming must take the additional steps of receiving
the signal when broadcasting and taping the programming for
redistribution1ee Furthermore, the receiver must take the affir-
mative step of purchasing the service to descramble the signal
and to receive the broadcast in intelligible form. 85 The nature of
179. Id.
180. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
181. See supra text accompanying note 158.
182. The broadcaster could transmit a signal with no decoding signal, thus preventing
everyone from receiving and decoding the signal. See Prospectus, supra note 9, at 4.
183. "Restricted" broadcasts would be accomplished in much the same way as suggested
for dial-a-porn services in Sable, that is, for certain programming only certain signature
codes would be concurrently broadcast; for other programming, the number of signature
codes would be expanded or contracted depending upon the sexually-explicit content of
the programming. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
184. Modern technology is making this process easier today with innovations such as
television sets equipped with two built-in video cassette recorders. This development
demonstrates that "communications technology is dynamic, capable tomorrow of making
today obsolete:' Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd
on other grounds, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
185. Unlike the computer network's access code, the descrambling code is peculiar to
the descrambling device. Although a particular user generally can utilize any computer
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the medium removes it from any general public availability
analysis because a distributor has a greater ability to restrict
reception of the signal to certain communities than to restrict
distribution of magazines or other similar distribution media.
Signal Scrambling for Protection under Stanley v. Georgia 86
Any court faced with the issue of pornography on a direct
broadcast satellite signal must decide whether to protect the
broadcaster on the basis that the signal is unintelligible until it
reaches the home. Once the signal reaches inside the home and
is descrambled, Stanley v. Georgia187 protects the materials re-
ceived.
Again, a state may regulate the distribution,188 importation, 18 9
acquisition, 19 and transportation of obscene materials. Once inside
the home, however, the material gains the protection outlined in
Stanley.191
The home is the key to the protection. 192 In almost all cases
limiting the application of Stanley, the Supreme Court has re-
stricted the privacy rights extended to an individual viewing
obscene material to mere possession in the home:'93
to access the computer network, only the particular descrambling device can receive and
descramble a scrambled broadcast. Computer services that have restrictions on access
location do exist, however.
186. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
187. Id. In Stanley, the Court held that private possession of obscene material in the
home is not a criminal act. Id. at 568. For a discussion of the decision in Stanley, see
Meyerson, supra note 52, at 144-46.
188. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971); Gable v. Jenkins, 397 U.S. 592
(1970), affg 309 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
189. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973);
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376-77 (1971).
190. See 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 126.
191. Stanley does not protect the possession of child pornography in the home because
a state has a strong interest to protect by punishing possession of pornography using
children. The state interest is not as strong in pornography using adults. Osborne v.
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
192. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 306-07 (1977).
193. E.g., United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973):
The essence of appellee's contentions is that Stanley has firmly established
the right to possess obscene material in the privacy of the home and that
this creates a correlative right to receive it, transport it, or distribute it.
We have rejected that reasoning. This case was decided by the District
Court before our decisions in United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363 (1971), and United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). Those holdings
negate the idea that some zone of constitutionally protected privacy follows
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If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment in
itself carried with it a "penumbra" of constitutionally protected
privacy, this Court would not have found it necessary to decide
Stanley on the narrow basis of the "privacy of the home,"
which was hardly more than a reaffirmation that "a man's
home is his castle." Moreover, we have declined to equate the
privacy of the home relied on in Stanley with a "zone" of
"privacy" that follows a distributor or consumer of obscene
materials wherever he goes.
194
The Supreme Court has rested its limitation of Stanley not on
whether commercial exploitation or distribution occurred,'19 5 but
on the presence of the obscene material in the "public environ-
ment."1 196 Once the material has reached the home, the court
should no longer address the question of whether "such materiali
has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to endanger
the public safety, or to jeopardize . . . the States' 'right . . . to
maintain a decent society.' "n
Further, satellite transmissions are similar to the subscription
television service analyzed in Chartwell Communications Group
v. Westbrook'9" and, as such, may not be amenable to normal
broadcast regulation. In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a subscription television
such material when it is moved outside the home area protected by Stanley.
Id. at 141-42; see also 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 126 (noting that
Stanley rested on the concurrence of three Justices who "indicated that the case could
have been disposed of on Fourth Amendment grounds without reference to the nature
of the materials").
194. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (citation omitted) (deciding
not to extend the privacy rights for viewing obscene material to individuals viewing such
material in movie theaters); see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (citing
Stanley to support the right to be free from others protesting another's home). But see
Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108 n.3 (reiterating that the "decision in Stanley was 'firmly grounded
in the First Amendment' ") (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986)).
195. See, e.g., 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8ram. Film, 413 U.S. at 125 ("The narrow issue
directly presented in this case, and not in Thirty-seven Photographs, is whether the United
States may constitutionally prohibit importation of obscene material which the importer
claims is for private, personal use and possession only.").
196. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 68-69 ("[C]ommercial exploitation of
depictions, descriptions, or exhibitions of obscene conduct on commercial premises open
to the adult public falls within a State's broad power to regulate commerce and protect
the public environment"); see also 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 126
("Stanley depended, not on any First Amendment right to purchase or possess obscene
materials, but on the right to privacy in the home.').
197. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 69 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199
(1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
198. 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980).
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program utilizing a scrambled, signal was unintelligible until de-
scrambled with special equipment and inherently not intended to
be received by the general public.19 The court refused to char-
acterize the signal as a broadcast and therefore found that it did
not need to analyze the signal as such for the purposes of
regulation. 200
The scrambled direct broadcast satellite transmission is even
further removed from being intelligible than the broadcast ana-
lyzed in Chartwell Communications. Possession of a decoding
device alone does not allow for translation of the signal into
something comprehensible. Unless the signal itself contains the
signature code for a particular decoding device, any reception of
the signal is unintelligible. 201
All other forms of media are either intelligible in primary form,
such as magazines and newspapers, or intelligible after transla-
tion through commonly available subsidiary devices, such as
radios, televisions, or motion picture projectors. Even communi-
cations requiring translation through a subsidiary device are
generally translatable through any subsidiary device of the same
type. For example, any VCR can play any particular video tape.
On the other hand, a receiver of a direct broadcast signal must
utilize a particular decoding device to make each broadcast of
scrambled direct broadcast satellite transmission intelligible.
This characteristic of the scrambled direct broadcast satellite
transmission is unique. The signal is distinguishable from all
other forms of media in that receivers are incapable of translating
the signal into intelligible form by any interchangeable, commonly
accessible translation device. This distinguishing characteristic
provides the groundwork for full protection of the signal under
Stanley v. Georgia.2 2 As long as the material is not obscene at
the location the producer develops and scrambles the material,
its transmission in a scrambled, unintelligible form would seem
to be constitutionally protected. 23
A state or the federal government may regulate an electronic,
unintelligible signal for obscenity provided that the broadcast or
the receipt of that signal, as converted into an intelligible com-
199. Id. at 465.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 15-16.
202. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
203. This conclusion does not imply that similar protection could or should be extended
to child pornography in a similar scrambled form. The interests of the state in protection
of children would far outweigh the privacy interest Stanley protects.
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munication, can similarly be regulated for obscenity. 24 If the
government is able to regulate the material in question for
obscenity, and if the government does not consider that material
in question to be obscene in that location, the location becomes
a so-called safety zone from which individuals may freely distrib-
ute the materials.
Under Stanley, courts will protect obscenity in the home. The
scrambled direct broadcast satellite signal is unintelligible while
outside the home. A fact finder cannot hold an unintelligible
signal beamed from one protected area to another as obscene if
one cannot receive and translate the material, because the only
material susceptible to that classification is that which an indi-
vidual can perceive and understand through the senses. Once the
receiver secures the scrambled transmission and descrambles it
within the home, transforming it into an intelligible form capable
of being classified as obscene, the transmission, as well as the
receipt of the transmission, gains Stanley protection.
Under this analysis, a court would no longer look solely to the
disseminator of the "message," the unintelligible and nonobscene
signal. The right of the receiver to receive the unintelligible but
uniquely translatable signal would determine the right of the
transmitter to send the scrambled signal. 05 This analysis is in
accord with the Court's analysis in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen-
eral,206 in which the Court found that the post office could not
require a written request authorizing delivery to the receiver
prior to the dissemination of communist propaganda through the
204. The following example exemplifies the concept discussed: An individual in Com-
munity A possesses a sexually explicit photograph not considered obscene in Community
A. This individual beams a scrambled recreation of the photograph across Community B
and into Community C where another individual receives and descrambles the signal to
reproduce the photograph. Assume that Community B considers the photograph obscene,
but that Community C does not. Community B cannot prosecute either individual for
distribution of obscenity in Community B unless some person within Community B could
and did receive the signal and convert the signal into an intelligible, obscene communi-
cation. Without this receipt and conversion, Community B could not prove the prima
facie case of distribution of obscene materials because it would be unable to prove the
distribution element. Furthermore, unless the individual in Community A doubted the
impossibility of an individual in Community B receiving and converting the signal,
Community B could not prove the prima facie case of attempt to distribute obscene
materials because it would be unable to prove the intent element. The argument parallels
that put forth by USSC in its Motion to Dismiss in the American Exxxtasy cases.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment, State v. U.S. Satellite, Inc., No. 90-000971, at
5 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Ala. filed June 8, 1990).
205. This proposition, of course, would be true only if the community in which the
material was produced and scrambled would not itself find the material obscene. See
supra note 145 and accompanying text.
206. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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mails.2 17 The right of the receiver to receive the communication
determines the right of the disseminator 0 8 Courts would be
incapable of labeling the scrambled and unintelligible signal ob-
scene and would similarly be unable to deny its nature as a
message.
ONE Too MANY "LOGICAL" EXTENSIONS
Although the analysis detailed above is sound in theory, it fails
to account for and protect the basic framework of most criminal
laws affecting communication. Stretched to its extreme, the anal-
ysis creates one too many "logical" extensions. 20 9
In the American Exxxtasy Channel cases, children gained ac-
cess to the broadcasts either directly or through video cassette
tapes of the broadcasts. The children's parents took an affirma-
tive step to receive the broadcasts by purchasing the service.
Presumably, they knew of the nature of the broadcasts. HDOS
initiated the American Exxxtasy Channel broadcasts from a
protected safety zone and the parents received the broadcasts in
their home, also a protected safety zone.
If the children gained access to the broadcasts first-hand, then
the parents should have had the power to lock out the channel
and prevent the access.2 10 If the children instead gained access
to the movies by way of tapes the parents had made of the
broadcasts, the parents could have prevented access to these
tapes.211
One cannot make an analogy to the case of unexpected expo-
sure to indecent materials. Adults had to subscribe to the Amer-
ican Exxxtasy Channel service to gain intelligible access to the
207. Id. at 305.
208. Id. at 307.
209. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
210. An interesting sidelight to the lockbox question appears in Bauman, supra note
140, at 611, in which the writer finds troublesome the practice of charging money for the
rental of the cable lockboxes: "The notion of requiring subscribers to pay to keep obscenity
from being broadcast into their homes seems to controvert the idea of obscenity not
being protected by the first amendment." Id. at 615 n.23. Such a problem does not arise
in the case of the American Exxxtasy Channel, nor in the case of a premium channel
being subscribed to through cable television. Unlike the basic tier service available to
cable subscribers, the premium channel and satellite subscribers must take the additional
affirmative step to receive a singular service that is otherwise not available and that is
received knowing of its particular content.
211. See Meyerson, supra note 52, at 164-65 (discussing the distinction between chil-
dren's access to radio broadcasts and access to subscription cable television).
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broadcasts.212 In the American Exxxtasy Channel scrambled sig-
nal situation, no unwilling receivers viewed the signal. Thus, the
ability of the government to regulate the signal would seem to
be at a minimum. 213
The courts have placed limits on the extent of the freedoms
outlined, however, and the courts could extend these limits to
create one more, perhaps final, exception to the Stanley rule:
No government-be it federal, state, or local-should be forced
to choose between repressing all material, including that within
the realm of decency, and allowing unrestrained license to
publish any material, no matter how vile. There must be a rule
of reason in this as in other areas of the law . . . .214
If a court allowed this "safety zone" logic to prevail, the wall
courts have erected around the Stanley protection would begin
to crumble. The Supreme Court has consistently found a legiti-
mate state interest in "stemming the tide of commercialized
obscenity" 215 to etch into the Stanley protection. No reason exists
to believe that the Court would proceed differently in the present
case.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,216 the Court found the
interest in "stemming the tide" 217 to be compelling despite the
assumption that the theater could prevent minors and noncon-
212. Cf FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 730 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concerning
a radio broadcast picked up by a listener while scanning the radio dial).
213. [T]he right of a speaker to communicate through the mails outweighed a
recipient's interest in preventing entry into the home of objectionable [but
not obscene] material. Although the Court in [Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965)] had held that requiring a recipient to request material
unconstitutionally burdened the right to receive information, the Court [in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)] stated that the
"short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can . .. is an
acceptable burden" on the right to avoid offensive material. This burden is
only acceptable, however, when the combined rights of a speaker to send
the material and of a willing home dweller to receive it balance against the
rights of an unwilling recipient. When the willing recipient does not appear
in the equation, the balance shifts in favor of the right to limit the material
that enters one's home.
Meyerson, supra note 52, at 147 (footnotes omitted). The author also argues that the
postal cases are "as close to an ideal solution as can be achieved in a complex world of
competing interests and differing tastes." Id. at 148.
214. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), quoted in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 n.5 (1973).
215. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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senting adults from viewing the films in question.218 The theater
owners protected the films in Paris Adult Theatre I from dissem-
ination to minors in a way that the films shown over the American
Exxxtasy Channel could not be,219 yet the visible presence of the
theater in the community was enough to invoke the interest.20
Furthermore, the history of new communication media presents
a foreshadowing of new communication developments that could
possibly stretch the Stanley limits to the breaking point.
The Limitation Argument Based on Obscenity Alone
The counterargument to the safety zone logic is that the
government has a right to regulate the stream of commerce. 1
Obscenity regulatioh is simply incidental to this right.2 Indeed,
the Supreme Court relied on this governmental right to decide
in United States v. Orito. 03 Orito was found to have transported
eighty-three reels of allegedlym obscene films.m Somewhat anal-
ogous to the American Exxxtasy Channel cases, Orito had con-
veyed the films by common carrier airlines.228 He attacked the
relevant statute2 7 as being overly broad, claiming that the statute
218. Id. at 57-58.
219. A child lock-out feature was presumably available for the direct broadcast satellite
home stations, although in this case, this feature did not prevent children from gaining
access. Children could have gained access despite the lock-out feature for various reasons:
because it was not present in the home, because it was not activated, or because the
adult user videotaped the films. The distributor of the direct broadcast satellite trans-
mission does not have the control over the distribution of the films to adolescents to the'
degree present for the theater owner in Paris Adult Theatre L See id.
220. See id. at 59. One can counter the argument that a sufficiently large section of
the community tolerated the movies involved in Paris Adult Theatre I to keep the theater
open by addressing the possibility that the owner may have been taking a loss on the
theater and subsidizing the theater operations with other business concerns. The Court
did not comment on the economic strength of the theater.
221. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
222. Because obscenity is not protected speech, the material is solely a product subject
to the regulatory powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Cf. Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68-69 (1973) (resting the decision not to extend privacy
rights to individuals viewing obscene material in movie theaters on "a States broad
power to regulate commerce").
223. 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973).
224. On the day that the Supreme Court decided Orito, it also developed the Miller
test for judging whether a particular communication is obscene. See Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 30-32 (1973); see also supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. The Court
thus vacated and remanded the Orito case to the district court for reconsideration of the
obscenity determination. Orito, 413 U.S. at 145.
225. Orito, 413 U.S. at 140.
226. Id.
227. 18 U.S.C. S 1462 (1988) (prohibiting the use of common carriers in the transportation
of obscene materials).
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failed to distinguish cases in which transportation "involved no
risk of exposure to children or unwilling adults." 23
The Supreme Court was not willing to accept the distinction
that the material was inaccessible to any but the transporter:2
Given (a) that obscene material is not protected under the
First Amendment, (b) that the Government has a legitimate
interest in protecting the public commercial environment by
preventing such material from entering the stream of com-
merce, and (c) that no constitutionally protected privacy is
involved, we cannot say that the Constitution forbids compre-
hensive federal regulation of interstate transportation of ob-
scene material merely because such transport may be by private
carriage, or because the material is intended for the private
use of the transporter. . . Congress may regulate on the
basis of the natural tendency of material in the home being
kept private and the contrary tendency once material leaves
that area, regardless of a transport's professed intent.?"
The Court reiterated the familiar reasoning that Congress has
the right to regulate interstate commerce even on the basis of
morality as long as a rational relationship justifies that regula-
tion.231 The Court found irrelevant the fact that Orito utilized a
means of transportation that would protect children and non-
voluntary adults from exposure. 232
The Supreme Court has severely curtailed the reach of Stanley.
In much the same manner, the courts should not permit Stanley
228. 0nto, 413 U.S. at 141.
229. The Court did note that the tariffs of common carriers generally included the
right to inspect the items being transported. Id. at 142 n.5.
230. Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
231. The Court reinvoked the Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903), as well as a series of
other cases, in finding the morals legislation valid:
Congress could reasonably determine such regulation to be necessary to
effect permissible federal control of interstate commerce in obscene material,
based as that regulation is on a legislatively determined risk of ultimate
exposure to juveniles or to the public and the harm that exposure could
cause .... It is sufficient to reiterate the well-settled principle that Con-
gress may impose relevant conditions and requirements on those who use
the channels of interstate commerce in order that those channels will not
become the means of promoting or spreading evil, whether of a physical,
moral or economic nature."
Orito, 413 U.S. at 143-44 (quoting North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)); see
also id. at 144-45 n.6 (quoting Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1925) (stating
that Congress can forbid and punish the use of interstate commerce as an agency "to
promote immorality, dishonesty or the spread of evil")).
232. Onto, 413 U.S. at 143.
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to protect the transmission of materials that could reach the
home in an otherwise unintelligible manner through scrambled
direct broadcast satellite. The Supreme Court has stated: "[I]t is
extremely difficult to control the uses to which obscene material
is put . ... Even single copies, represented to be for personal
use, can be quickly and cheaply duplicated by modern technology
thus facilitating wide-scale distribution." VCRs are the present
"modern technology" that facilitated the wide-scale distribution
of the allegedly obscene, though admittedly unintelligible signal
in the American Exxxtasy Channel cases.
The distinctive nature of direct satellite broadcasting fails to
create a rational exception to the general rule proscribing the
distribution of obscene matter in interstate commerce. The courts
should find this exception based solely on the technology of the
medium designed to prevent reception, not on the traditional
grounds of viewpoint scarcity.m The "seductive plausibility of
single steps in [the] chain of evolutionary development of [the]
legal rule" 5 has found its "logical extreme."' 6
The Supreme Court has an alternative solution to this legal
rule that has now found its logical extreme. In place of erecting
another wall around Stanley, it could overrule Stanley altogether.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has threatened the reversal of Stan-
ley, stating, "it is not unreasonable to assume that had [Stanley]
not been so delineated [as a line of demarcation between what
is acceptable and what is not], Stanley would not be the law
today .",237
Building another wall around Stanley would be more desirable
because the basics of Stanley would remain intact without sac-
rificing any recognized state interest heretofore protected. A
proclaimed "bright line" of allowing the regulation of the other-
wise unintelligible, scrambled signals would keep all rights in
place as they existed prior to the development of the new
technology. The advent of avoidance technology developed by
broadcasters seeking to avoid legal prohibitions should not so
233. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973).
234. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984) (concerning
editorial control of educational radio broadcast stations); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (plurality opinion) (concerning humorous or obscene radio broadcasts); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding "fairness doctrine" in radio
broadcasts).
235. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 127.
236. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908), quoted in 12 200-
Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 127 n.5.
237. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. at 127.
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affect the rights of individuals who are not taking advantage of
that avoidance technology.2 No less-intrusive method of regulat-
ing this form of obscenity exists beyond that suggested. Sepa-
rating media technology regulation designed to further the
interests of a robust community dialogue through a multitude of
speakers would further the state goal of protecting interstate
commerce from the dissemination of pornography. When pre-
sented with the question of obscenity in the direct-broadcast
satellite context, the Supreme Court could validly utilize the
Commerce Clause to restrict the use of scrambled direct broad-
cast satellite transmission of pornographic material.2 9
Overruling Stanley is a logically seductive choice. More re-
strictions on Stanley seemingly leave only the shell of a right,
even less so than existed prior to this technology. With the
proposed restriction in place, however, a person may still consti-
tutionally possess in the home obscene sexually explicit material
depicting adults, 20 albeit with the total proscription on trans-
porting the same. The one remaining right not proscribed is the
right to produce this pornographic material within the home for
one's in-home personal use.241
238. The prohibition of the radar detector in the marketplace, clearly an item of
technology used solely to avoid speeding tickets, has not resulted in a concomitant loss
in any constitutional rights except the right to own a certain piece of technology.
239. This not very "picturesque" Commerce Clause logic uses the danger to justify the
iegulation. The Court used the same logic when upholding a ban on the transportation
of lottery tickets. Lottery Case, 188 U.S. 321, 356-62 (1903); see also United States v.
Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973) (acknowledging Congress' right to regulate the interstate
transportation of obscene material). Stanley itself seems to discount this argument:
[W]e are faced with the argument that prohibition of possession of obscene
materials is a necessary incident to statutory schemes prohibiting distribu-
tion. That argument is based on alleged difficulties of proving an intent to
distribute or in producing evidence of actual distribution. We are not con-
vinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they did we do not think that
they would justify infringement of the individual's right to read or observe
what he pleases. Because the right is so fundamental to our scheme of
individual liberty, its restriction may not be justified by the need to ease
the administration of otherwise valid criminal laws.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969), quoted in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
143 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
240. States may constitutionally prohibit the possession of child pornography regardless
of whether the possession of the material is in the home or for personal use. Osborne,
495 U.S. at 103.
241. Care should be taken not to extend this statement beyond its strict limits.
Certainly the home is not a buffer against the otherwise prohibited behaviors of pandering,
prostitution, production of child pornographic materials, or commercial production of
pornographic materials. Protected behavior includes the self-production of materials, such
as the writing of a book, the drawing of pictures, and the taking of self-portraits.
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Although the behavior protected may seem unworthy of sur-
rounding it with a monolithic bulwark, the mindset the behavior
evinces is worthy. Stanley correctly derided the stated goal of
the subject Georgia law to protect the individual's own mind and
morality: 242 "Whatever the power of the state to control public
dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of control-
ling a person's private thoughts.."243 Overruling Stanley to pro-
scribe all possession, production, and transportation of obscene
materials would have the seductive character of simplifying at
least one aspect of the convoluted obscenity law. It would also
represent the first impermissible inroad into the sacred territory
of an individual's thought processes.
Finally, the Court could decide to eliminate the community
standard for both scrambled and unscrambled pornographic ma-
terials for the determination of obscenity. It would then face the
question of how to establish a national obscenity standard. It
could decide to apply the lowest common denominator standard,
thus forcing the nation to adopt the moral standards of the least
tolerant community. Alternately, it could decide to apply a lib-
eralized standard, subjecting the least tolerant community to
withstand the onslaught of materials it now is capable of prohib-
iting 44 Finally, it could attempt to develop an "average" stan-
dard, compromising the interests of both the least tolerant and
the most tolerant communities.
At some point, the Supreme Court must adopt one of these
alternatives to deal with new communication technologies. Al-
though the present state of the communication arts does not
require such a choice, eventually the nation may become so
intertwined as to make the choice unavoidable. The Court pres-
ently, however, does not need to make such a Hobson's choice.
CONCLUSION
The government, either state or federal, cannot hold the com-
mon carrier direct broadcast satellite transmitter liable for car-
rying programming that any particular community would consider
242. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
243. Id. at 566.
244. The marketplace theory, suggesting that the least tolerant communities will not
be subjected to materials it otherwise would not tolerate, cannot withstand scrutiny.
Radio, television, and cable television, to some extent, utilize national broadcasts. Some
material otherwise not welcome would leach into the community.
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obscene unless the carrier has a pecuniary interest in the pro-
gramming or unless the carrier violates its federal mandate to
avoid exercising editorial control over broadcast material. If the
programming is in an unscrambled form, however, any local
community within the satellite's broadcast footprint may proceed
against the knowing participants in the broadcast. This local
community control over the transmission of direct broadcast
satellite signals introduces for the first time a minimum common
denominator obscenity standard, a standard that is by its nature
less tolerant than the previously rejected national obscenity
standard.
Direct broadcast satellite transmission is unique among media
forms for obscenity analysis. When the broadcast is scrambled,
distinctions between the direct broadcast satellite transmission
and other media types appear to permit an exception to the
general rule that transportation or broadcast of obscenity is
subject to regulation and proscription. A scrambled direct broad-
cast satellite transmission, in fact, may be completely protected
under Stanley as long as the- original production and scrambling
takes place in a community that would not find the material
obscene. The post-Stanley obscenity decisions indicate that this
predicted result may not be accurate. The arrival of the direct
broadcast satellite and the attendant use of that medium for the
transmission of obscenity in scrambled form poses a very real
threat to the existence of the Stanley protection.
John V. Edwards
